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The WTO and the Rights of the Individual

The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO) is silent
regarding its relationship to the individual.1 One might presume that an international organization
set up to emancipate trade could have no purpose other than upholding trading rights of private
actors. But the WTO was not established to achieve “free trade”. That goal is absent from the
Marrakesh Agreement. Instead, the goals of the Agreement are “reciprocal and mutually
advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to
trade” and the “elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations”.2 The term
“reciprocal arrangements” makes clear that the focus of the Marrakesh Agreement is not on the
individual trader, but rather on the meshing of governmental trade policies. This is confirmed by
the object of the quoted provision, namely, “international trade relations”. A visitor from another
planet who takes a quick look at the Marrakesh Agreement could draw an erroneous conclusion
about the Earth’s economy. The visitor could infer that international trade is carried on between
governments (or between nations) and that the intended beneficiaries of the Marrakesh Agreement
are the government Members of the WTO.
Such a hasty inference would be wrong however. Although the subjects of the Marrakesh
Agreement are the governments, a closer look at the multilateral trading system shows that
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individual economic actors are assimilated. Annexed to the Marrakesh Agreement are 17
interwoven trade agreements, most of which accord rights indirectly to the individual. This
important feature of WTO law has not received the attention that it deserves.
In recent years, some commentators have called the WTO the “World Trade Constitution”.3
Paralleling constitutions at the national level, the Marrakesh Agreement specifies decision rules and
delineates the separation of powers among the WTO organs. In this way, the Marrakesh Agreement
also resembles charters of other international agencies, such as the “Constitution” of the World
Health Organization. But the constitutional underpinnings of the WTO go deeper than that. The
WTO is constitution-like in reaching into the nation-state to guarantees rights to individuals.
The purpose of this article is to explore this little-noted dimension of international economic
law. The article proceeds as follows: Part I examines the way that WTO agreements mandate
certain rights for the individual in national law. Part II looks at the limited way in which the WTO
agreements provide procedural rights to individuals at the WTO. Part III discusses how the WTO’s
emerging jurisprudence expounds this new relationship and interprets WTO rules in light of the
needs of economic actors. Part IV proposes ways that a new WTO trade round could build on these
developments in order to strengthen private rights.
By “economic actor”, I mean an actor participating in the market and pursuing his, her or its
self-interest. Such actors can be natural persons, business corporations, partnerships, cooperatives
or labor unions. They operate as producers, consumers, service providers, exporters or importers.
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Larger economic actors are probably better able to take advantage of these WTO rights than smaller
actors are.

I. Individual Rights in National Law
Before discussing the WTO, one should say a brief word about individual rights in law. The
insight that law undergirds and promotes an efficient market can be traced back to the ancients. In
modern international law, the idea that governments have a common interest in the substantive
rights accorded to individuals in other countries first triumphed in the establishment of the
International Labor Organization in 1919. In that year, the ILO Maternity Convention provided that
a woman “shall have the right to leave her work if she produces a medical certificate stating that her
confinement [for childbirth] will probably take place within six weeks”.4 International prescription
of procedural rights within domestic law came a few years later. In 1927, the ILO Sickness
Insurance Convention directed governments to grant a “right to appeal” to an applicant in case of a
dispute.5 In 1933, the ILO Compulsory Old-Age Insurance Convention directed governments to
provide individuals and employers a right to appeal to “special tribunals”.6 Attention to procedural
rights is the leitmotif of the “rule of law” in a regulated economy. Whenever an agency or
bureaucrat is authorized to make a decision affecting an economic actor, the rule of law provides for
an appeal to a higher entity to complain against arbitrary action or self-dealing.
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With that as background, this article turns to new developments wrought by the Uruguay
Round. The WTO agreements comprise a system of obligations and rights for member
governments. None of these obligations applies directly to individual actors. With one exception,
no rights exist for economic actors within the WTO. Nevertheless, individuals secure rights
indirectly from the WTO.
Substantive Economic Rights
The WTO gives economic actors an entitlement to substantive rights in domestic law. The two
biggest gains came in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). By a substantive right, I mean a
property right or a legal guarantee of an opportunity to an economic actor. Such positive rights are a
new feature of the multilateral trading system. They were not present in the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947.
The TRIPS Agreement requires governments to create and grant intellectual “property rights”
to the nationals of other WTO member governments.7 In doing so, the drafters anticipated that these
rights would probably also be granted to domestic persons because it would be impolitic for a
government to give greater rights to aliens than to citizens. So economic actors may gain these
rights not only in foreign countries, but also in their own.
TRIPS is a broad, yet single-minded regime. It accords exclusive property rights for
copyrights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, integrated circuits, and
undisclosed information.8 The “right holders” are permitted to collect rents and to prevent others
7
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from infringing on their privilege for specified periods. These periods are lengthy; for example, an
inventor is given a patent for 20 years.9 Although one of the objectives of TRIPS is to promote
technological innovation, WTO member governments are not free to experiment with other
approaches that avoid the inefficiencies entailed by a government-established monopoly.10
The GATS applies the traditional most-favoured-nation (MFN) and national treatment
principles, but does so with a twist. In the GATT, the obligations of MFN and national treatment
apply to products.11 But in GATS, these principles are also applied to economic actors, namely
“service suppliers”.12 The MFN requirement states that a government shall accord to services and
service suppliers of other WTO member countries treatment no less favorable than accorded to like
services or service suppliers of any other country.13 The national treatment provision requires that a
government treat foreign services and service suppliers no less favorably than like domestic services
and service suppliers in the sectors prescribed in that government’s schedule of concessions.14
The innovator and service supplier do not acquire these substantive rights directly from TRIPS
and GATS, but rather from governments via the implementation of their WTO obligations. Thus, if
the treaty obligation is not fulfilled, an economic actor does not have a cause of action at the WTO.
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Its only recourse would be to petition the government denying the right, or to lobby its own
government to lodge a complaint at the WTO.
Because the substantive rights are extended only indirectly to individuals, the WTO can easily
disobligate a government to respect these core rights. This can occur through the WTO dispute
settlement system. To simplify a complex process, if a defendant government loses a case before a
WTO panel and then fails to bring its practices into compliance with WTO rules by the required
date, the winning plaintiff can gain WTO authorization to impose a sanction against the scofflaw
defendant government. This is what happened in the “Bananas” dispute in 1999, when the U.S.
government got WTO approval to levy high tariffs on products from the European Communities. In
2000, for the first time, the WTO permitted a withdrawal of intellectual property rights to be used as
a remedy. Specifically, the WTO gave the Government of Ecuador go-ahead to suspend its TRIPS
obligations to the European Communities.15 In giving the go-ahead, the WTO arbitrators pointed
out that this could abridge the private rights of individuals in Europe.16 Yet these private rights were
trumped by the need for the WTO dispute settlement system to approve a sanction on the
Communities.

Procedural Rights
To assist individual economic actors in gaining the benefits of WTO agreements, the drafters
established numerous procedural and administrative requirements to be met by member
governments. Many of these requirements provide a indirect right to an economic actor to seek
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relief, to submit comments to a national agency, or to appeal adjudicatory rulings. These are “due
process” rights. Unlike the substantive economic rights discussed above, these procedural rights
may apply to domestic actors, in addition to foreign actors.
The idea of using a trade treaty to mandate procedural rights did not originate in the Uruguay
Round. It was part of GATT Article X written in 1947. Most notably, GATT Article X:3(b)
requires each party to maintain “judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures for the
purpose, inter alia, of the prompt review and correction of administrative action relating to customs
matters”.17 Furthermore, this provision requires such tribunals to be independent of the
administering agency, and notes that appeals can be lodged by “importers.” GATT Article X also
contains a sunshine provision calling for the prompt publication of trade laws, regulations, and
administrative rulings in order to enable both governments and “traders” to become acquainted with
them.18
In requiring governments to accord such due process to economic actors, the original GATT
laid the foundation for broader rights in the WTO agreements. Like the GATT, the WTO does not
accord procedural rights directly to individuals (with one exception), but rather mandates that
member governments do so. In four WTO agreements, the guarantee of such procedural rights is a
central feature. These are the agreements on antidumping, subsidies, intellectual property, and
services.
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The Antidumping Agreement requires governments to give numerous procedural rights to a
domestic industry and to “interested parties”.19 Governments must initiate an antidumping
investigation upon the application of a domestic industry.20 Dumping is an attempt to sell an
exported product for less than its comparable sale price in the exporting country. When dumping
causes material injury to domestic producers, the importing government may seek to prevent the
imports by levying an antidumping duty. The Antidumping Agreement is not perfectly clear as to
whether the prescribed procedures must be carried out by all WTO member governments, or only by
those governments that utilize antidumping measures.
Once it begins an antidumping investigation, a government incurs many procedural duties. The
key duties are: (1) to give notice of the investigation to the public and to interested parties; (2) to
allow interested parties an ample opportunity to present evidence and to defend their interests; (3)
when an exporter has offered to raise prices in order to avoid an antidumping penalty, to give the
exporter a reason if such offer is rejected and to allow the exporter to make comments thereon; (4)
to offer judicial review, and (5) to give interested parties the right to seek sunset review of the
continued need for an antidumping duty, and then to terminate the duty if no longer needed.21
Interested parties include: the government of the country of export; the foreign exporter or
producer; the importer; a trade or business association whose members are producers, exporters, or
importers of the product under investigation; the producer of the competing product in the country
19
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of importation; and an association whose members produce the like product in the country of
importation.22 The procedural rights for interested parties to seek sunset review is especially
noteworthy as this process could be considered rulemaking rather than adjudication.
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) contains analogous
provisions regarding the investigation of foreign government subsidies and the imposition of
countervailing duties.23 Because they closely track the Antidumping provisions, they will not be
detailed here. In a few areas, however, the SCM Agreement goes beyond what is in the
Antidumping Agreement. First, under SCM, the investigating authority can make a decision only
on the basis of information in the written record which was available to interested parties
participating in the investigation.24 Second, governments agree to establish procedures to take due
account of representations made by interested domestic parties (including consumers) who might be
adversely affected by the imposition of a countervailing duty.25 Third, SCM makes clear that
judicial review is available to all interested parties who participated in the administrative proceeding
and are directly and individually affected.26 Finally, SCM requires every WTO member government
to conduct a countervailing duty investigation upon the application of a domestic industry.27
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Governments are not obligated to impose countervailing duties, but they would seem to be obligated
to commence an investigation upon a proper request.28
The TRIPS Agreement contains numerous procedural obligations on governments toward the
holders of private rights. One key obligation is “Transparency”.29 Laws and regulations must be
published in such a manner as to enable governments and rights holders to become acquainted with
them.30 Another key obligation is to establish an enforcement system. Every government must
enable an economic actor to institute administrative or judicial proceedings against any infringement
of his intellectual property rights.31 If imported goods are involved, the government must adopt a
procedure to permit the right holder to ask the Customs Authorities to block the free circulation of a
good lacking an authentic trademark or copyright.32 By emphasizing the need to domesticate TRIPS
obligations into national law, and by providing for a private right of action, TRIPS may be perhaps
the most self-enforcing of all the WTO agreements.33
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The GATS requires governments to accord due process to foreign economic actors.34
Specifically, each government must maintain “judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or
procedures which provide, at the request of an affected service supplier, for the prompt review of,
and where justified, appropriate remedies for, administrative decisions affecting trade in services”.35
When prior authorization is required for the supply of a service, the government must give the
applicant a decision within a reasonable period of time and inform the applicant as to the status of
the application for authorization.36 In the “Reference Paper” for Basic Telecommunications
Services, the subscribing governments commit to give a service supplier recourse to an
“independent domestic body” in order to resolve disputes regarding interconnection with a major
supplier.37 One other provision in GATS should be noted even though it does not confer a right:
The GATS directs governments to work in cooperation with relevant intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations towards the adoption of common international standards for setting
qualifications of service suppliers.38
The attention to economic actors is less central in other WTO agreements, but still an important
feature. The Safeguards Agreement requires governments, when commencing a safeguard
investigation, to give public notice and to hold hearings in which importers, exporters and other
interested parties can provide evidence and respond to the presentations of other parties.39 The
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Customs Valuation Agreement requires governments to establish in law the right of the importer to
appeal a determination of customs value.40 The Rules of Origin Agreement provides that an
exporter or importer may ask a government for an official assessment of the origin of a good.41 The
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) directs governments to
provide a “reasonable interval” between the publication of a new regulation and its entry into force
in order to provide time for “producers” to adapt their products and methods of production.42 The
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) requires governments, when introducing a new
technical regulation, to publish a notice so as to enable interested parties to become acquainted with
the regulation, and allow a “reasonable interval” before the regulation enters into force unless urgent
circumstances exist.43 Attached to the TBT Agreement is a binding Code of Good Practice for
standardizing bodies.44 The Code goes further than TBT in calling for interested parties to be given
a 60-day period for the submission of comments.45 The standardizing body is directed to “take into
account” the comments, and to reply if requested.46 Finally the Agreement on Government
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1994, Articles 11.1, 11.2. Note that in 1947, GATT Article VII:5 provided that the methods for
determining value should be “given sufficient publicity to enable traders to estimate, with a
reasonable degree of certainty, the value for customs purposes”. This is a transparency provision.
41

WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin, Articles 2(h), 3(f). This assessment is to be provided as soon
as possible but no later than 150 days. Moreover, it must be reviewable by an independent tribunal.
42

WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures [hereinafter SPS],
Article 7, Annex B, paragraph 2. An exception exists for urgent circumstances.
43

WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade [hereinafter TBT], Articles 2.9.1, 2.10, 2.12.

44

The Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards is Annex 3
of the TBT Agreement. TBT Article 4 makes the Code binding on central government
standardizing bodies. In the TBT lexicon, “regulations” are mandatory, while “standards” are not
mandatory. TBT Annex 1.
45

TBT Code of Good Practice, paragraph L.

46

Ibid., paragraph N.

13

Procurement requires parties to establish procedures to enable suppliers to challenge alleged
breaches of the Agreement.47 The challenges are to be heard by a domestic court or by an
independent review body.

II. Individual Rights at the WTO
Part II of this article addresses another new aspect of the world trading system, the extension of
procedural rights directly to the economic actor. Compared to the numerous provisions discussed
above, this facet of WTO constitutionalism is only thinly developed. Thus, Part II is short.
This novel feature emerged in the Agreement on Preshipment Inspection (PSI). Preshipment
inspection verifies the quality, quantity, price, and customs classification of goods. Some
governments mandate that goods be inspected before inward shipment. The PSI Agreement
obligates those governments to require the inspection entity to make available a grievance procedure
for exporters.48 Then, two working days after such a grievance is lodged, either the exporter or the
inspector may refer the dispute to the “Independent Entity”.49 The WTO established the
Independent Entity in 1995, in cooperation with the International Federation of Inspection Agencies
and the International Chamber of Commerce.50 If such referrals occur, the Independent Entity will
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set up an arbitral panel whose decisions are binding on the exporter and inspector.51 The role of the
panel is to decide whether the parties have complied with the PSI Agreement.52
This review procedure gives an economic actor – the exporter – a procedural right of action
under WTO rules. The exporter can bring a grievance to the WTO. The exporter’s claim would be
that the agent of the importing government (i.e., the preshipment inspector) is violating the PSI
Agreement. In other words, the individual is empowered to enforce international trade law through
the WTO’s Independent Entity. So far, this unique provision has not been tested.

III. Jurisprudence on the Individual
Although the WTO dispute settlement system considers only disputes between governments, all
such disputes reflect rivalry among private economic actors. A dispute that is exclusively between
sovereign governments is imaginable -- for example, two state trading entities -- but no such cases
have arisen in the WTO. Despite the centrality of private actors in trade disputes, these actors are
not explicitly acknowledged in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding.
Nevertheless, WTO panels are beginning to lift the governmental veil to see the economic
actors who are the real stakeholders in a dispute. The leading case is United States Section 301
where the panel held that a hypothetical application of a controversial U.S. trade law did not violate
WTO rules.53 The panel agreed with the plaintiff, the European Communities, that a prospective
implementation of the “Section 301” law could be a current violation of WTO rules, but in this
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Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, Report of the Panel, 22 December 1999,
WT/DS152/R, paragraph 8.1 [hereinafter Section 301 Panel Report]. Section 301 authorizes the
U.S. Trade Representative to investigate foreign trade practices that burden U.S. commerce and to
retaliate against foreign countries.
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instance, the panel accepted the U.S. government’s defense that the U.S. Trade Representative did
not have discretion to impinge WTO law in the manner alleged.54
The pregnant holdings of the panel vis-à-vis the individual economic operator came in the
analysis of why a measure of general applicability not yet enforced can still be actionable in the
WTO. The panel begins its analysis by pointing out that the “GATT/WTO did not create a new
legal order the subjects of which comprise both contracting parties or Members and their
nationals”.55 But then the panel reflects on the role of the WTO, and surmises that
. . . it would be entirely wrong to consider that the position of individuals
is of no relevance to the GATT/WTO legal matrix. Many of the benefits
to Members which are meant to flow as a result of the acceptance of
various disciplines under the GATT/WTO depend on the activity of
individual economic operators in the national and global market places.56
Then, building on this reasoning, the panel draws a significant, startling, conclusion. That is, “the
multilateral trading system is, per force, composed not only of States but also, indeed mostly, of
individual economic operators”.57 The panel holds that the needs of such operators should be a
factor in determining whether a particular WTO provision is being violated by a government.58
According to the panel, exposing an individual operator to the risk of WTO inconsistent action by a
government can itself constitute a WTO violation because of the “chilling effect” and loss of
“confidence” by such operators.59
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David Hawes, Terje Johannessen, and Joseph Weiler.
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The Section 301 decision is startling because, through its careful logic and citation of
precedents, the panel looks behind the curtain of WTO dispute settlement to reveal more than a
clash of sovereigns. The panel suggests that in considering whether one sovereign has violated its
treaty obligation to the other, the judge can properly consider not just the interests of the sovereigns,
but also the private actors. That’s what the panel means in saying that economic operators are part
of the world trading system. The WTO dispute settlement system will surely build on this insight in
the future, as economic operators push governments to comply with their obligations.
The panel’s broad statements about the marrow of WTO law may seem jarring because the role
of international judges in treaty interpretation is less developed than the role of national judges in
interpreting a constitution. But the enhanced role for the WTO judge is a manifestation of the
evolution of world trade law from its simpler beginnings in the GATT. This process was foreseen
by a few commentators. For example, Victoria Curzon Price -- building on insights of Friedrich A.
von Hayek -- predicted that the process of articulating written trade rules will produce new rules.60
The Section 301 decision was not appealed, and thus was not affirmed by the Appellate Body.
The question of what duties a government owes to economic actors arose in two earlier decisions.
In the Gasoline case, the Appellate Body adjudged the United States to be violating the GATT
because U.S. environmental officials took into account the regulatory costs of domestic refiners
while disregarding the costs incurred by foreign refiners.61 In the India Patent Protection case, the
Appellate Body narrowed the judgment of the first-level panel, and stated that “we do not agree with
the Panel that the legitimate expectations of Members and private rights holders concerning
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Victoria Curzon Price: New Institutional Developments in GATT, in: Minnesota Journal of Global
Trade, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1992, pp. 87, 109-110.
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United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the Appellate
Body, 29 April 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R, p. 28.
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conditions of competition must always be taken into account in interpreting the TRIPS Agreement”.
62

IV. Strengthening Private Rights in the New Trade Round
Although governments sought to launch a new trade round in Seattle at the end of 1999, this
effort failed for many reasons, one of which was a lack of enthusiasm by citizens in many countries.
Despite the advantages to private actors of freer trade, the WTO has failed to explain its constructive
role to the public. Indeed, public opinion is often skeptical of the WTO, and many groups view it
unfavorably.
In my view, the biggest public relations problem faced by the WTO is that its state-centricity
impedes its ability to explain the benefits of trade rules. More awareness of how the WTO
indirectly confers legal rights to individuals, as detailed above, could enhance the WTO in public
esteem. Politicians should seek to “sell” the new round, in part, as a way to protect individual actors
against arbitrary bureaucratic action. In other words, rather than selling the WTO as an exercise in
deepening commitments among governments, politicians should be trumpeting the ways that the
WTO improves the legal status of the individual. Part IV of the article proposes that the new round
address substantive rights in national law, procedural rights in national law, procedural rights at the
WTO, and public perceptions.

Substantive Economic Rights
Ideally, the WTO would prohibit all protectionist policies and mandate a presumption in favor
of a right of individuals to import and export.63 Yet promoting free trade so unabashedly would be
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India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, Report of the
Appellate Body, 19 December 1997, WT/DS50/AB/R, para. 48.
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anathema for most WTO member governments. So one should consider other ways to strengthen
economic rights.
One proposal is to enlist the WTO in the campaign to address the “digital divide” by
emphasizing the issue of internet access. This could be done in the ongoing GATS negotiations. A
recent study by Reporters Sans Frontières found that 45 countries severely curtail internet access for
nationals. The WTO might start with that high-profile regulatory problem and then work to assure
market access and interconnection for internet service providers seeking to compete in new markets.
In this way, the WTO could champion better economic opportunities for consumers (and service
suppliers).
Another idea is to repeal the provision in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding that
permits a plaintiff government winning a case to dishonor the intellectual property rights of the
losing defendant government when that government fails to comply with a WTO judgment.64 As
noted above, a WTO panel recently authorized Ecuador to flout intellectual property rights of
European Union nationals. This is a very disturbing legal development that punctures holes in the
TRIPS Agreement and contradicts the rationale for including TRIPS within the trading system.
Furthermore, in authorizing such action, the WTO encourages Ecuador and similarly situated
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countries to ignore their pre-existing obligations under intellectual property conventions.65 The
WTO should not be inducing and abetting such violations of economic rights.66

Procedural Rights in National Law
Although similar due process rights appear in several WTO agreements, these provisions are
unlinked and the Marrakesh Agreement makes no attempt to articulate an overall purpose for them.
This omission was a missed opportunity for Uruguay Round negotiators to explain to the public how
WTO rules protect individual actors against arbitrary governmental action both at home and in other
countries. Governments deserve more credit than they have gotten for signing on to these
obligations.
The next round should fill in this gap by making clearer the foundations for the emerging
international administrative law on trade.67 A country may be concerned about the administrative
procedures used in other countries for at least three reasons. First, a government cannot receive the
anticipated value of a trade negotiation unless its nationals get the promised treatment in other
markets, and can use foreign tribunals to complain about an arbitrary denial of that treatment. If a
government wants its nationals to have that opportunity in foreign countries, however, it must give
foreign nationals equivalent opportunities in domestic tribunals. Second, all countries have an
interest in promoting better government practices in other countries because that will enable each
country to enhance its comparative advantage and therefore lift total world income. A transparent,
65

Ecuador Arbitration, paragraph 152.

66

To be sure, TRIPS can be criticized for glorifying private interests over public interests. But the
solution to that is to amend TRIPS, not to flout it.
67

The term “International administrative law” has traditionally referred to the law governing the
relationship between an inter-governmental organization and its staff. I use the term differently here
to describe international supervision of the rulemaking and adjudication procedures employed by
national agencies.

20

fair system of administrative law is a key component of good practice because it can correct the
mistakes made by bureaucrats. Third, the right of an individual to participate in decisionmaking that
affects him enhances the legitimacy of the ensuing decisions.
The WTO provisions for procedural rights extend both to adjudication and to rulemaking. The
adjudication provisions are far more developed however. For example, an individual actor with an
interest in a new countervailing duty investigation has a right to receive notice, to present written
evidence, to review the public docket, to be informed of the essential facts in time to defend its
interest, to make a representation against the countervailing duty, to receive notice of preliminary
and final determinations, and to seek judicial review.68 On the other hand, if a government proposes
to rewrite its countervailing duty law or the accompanying regulations, the SCM Agreement does
not accord any procedural rights to the economic actor. In other words, the SCM Agreement does
not require prior notice or the opportunity for public comment. This is so even when a government
changes its countervailing duty law in response to a decision by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.
The closest the SCM agreement gets to rulemaking is that it gives a private actor an opportunity to
comment on a governmental review of whether a countervailing duty should be discontinued.69
Private actors need notice-and-comment provisions on national rulemaking with regard to both
trade and domestic regulation.70 GATT Article X:2 provides for advance notice of general trade
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regulations, but does not accord an opportunity to give comments.71 The other WTO agreements
regarding trade policy (e.g., safeguards) also fail to provide individuals any right to comment. Two
of the WTO agreements supervising domestic regulation -- GATS and SPS -- lack any notice-andcomment process for economic actors.72 Another agreement on domestic regulation, TBT, does
provide for notice-and-comment. This requirement is contained in the Code of Good Practice which
calls for giving interested parties a 60-day period for the submission of comments on proposed
standards. The TBT does not require a notice-and-comment process for the adoption of
“regulations”, however, even though the mandatory nature of regulations makes such
communication more important than it is for non-mandatory “standards”.
Notice-and-comment requirements would be particularly useful in WTO agreements dealing
with domestic regulation. For example, a government contemplating a new sanitary health
regulation should open itself up to criticism by private economic actors as to whether the proposed
measure is too stringent or too lax. A vibrant public comment procedure could head off the
adoption of an unnecessary regulation that can lead to a trade dispute. The WTO should require
governments to give a public response to any comments received.
The prospects for putting this topic on the agenda of the next round are uncertain.73 Some
WTO delegates would surely protest that a government’s decisionmaking is too intrinsically
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domestic to become a topic for international minimum standards. Yet governments have agreed on
the norm of public participation in environmental policymaking, most notably in the Åarhus
Convention of 1998.74 This Convention commits governments to provide adequate and timely
public notice of pending decisions and to put in place a procedure for the public to submit comments
in writing or at a public hearing.75 Governments have also provided for public participation in labor
treaties. For example, the ILO Convention on Workers with Family Responsibilities states that
employer and worker organizations “shall have the right to participate, in a manner appropriate to
national conditions and practice, in devising and applying measures to give effect to the provisions
of this Convention”.76 In early 2001, three former Directors-General of the GATT/WTO issued a
joint public statement addressing the current state of the multilateral trading system. Among their
recommendations was: “Where they have not already done so, we would encourage all governments
to open up trade policy debate at the national level.”

Procedural Rights at the WTO
As noted above, private actors lack standing to lodge complaints in the WTO. This contrasts
with some international human rights courts (such as the European Court of Human Rights) where

procedural rights of private actors would “render the domestic branch of the functioning of GATT
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individuals can bring cases against governments.77 For the foreseeable future, however, the WTO is
not going to give private actors a right to prosecute governments for violating world trade law.
One reform that is conceivable would be for the WTO to give private actors a right to defend
themselves before a WTO panel. The need for this does not come up often. But when it does, the
affected private actor lacks any right to respond. The best example is the Australia Leather case
which will be discussed below. In a typical WTO case, there are private actors who will be affected
depending on which government wins the case. Yet these effects are extrinsic to the panel’s
decision which is almost always focused on governmental behavior.
In the Australia Leather dispute, the U.S. government was successful in characterizing an
Australian government grant to the leather producer Howe and Company as a prohibited export
subsidy, in violation of the SCM Agreement.78 The panel did not give Howe any opportunity to
argue that the grant to it was not an export subsidy. But that incapacity is normal. The WTO has
adjudicated several export subsidy cases all of whom have stakeholders who are not heard from in
during proceedings.
What was unusual, and troubling, in the Leather case was Howe’s absence during the
compliance review proceedings in 1999. The panel ruled that Australia had failed to comply
because it had not required Howe to repay the subsidy to the government.79 This was the first time
any GATT or WTO panel issued a judgment that would require a private actor to repay money to a
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government. In a previous GATT case, a government was directed to repay an antidumping duty
erroneously collected from an importer, but there the private actor was being compensated. In
Australia Leather, the private actor was to be billed. The panel acknowledged that its decision
could result in “some interference with private rights”, but this did not trigger any introspection by
the panel.80 Given the important precedent being set in this case, which might be characterized as a
WTO-required confiscation, it was unfortunate that the panel did not offer Howe an opportunity to
present a defense. This could have easily been done since WTO rules give every panel the authority
to seek information from any individual or body that the panel deems appropriate.81
If it becomes the regular practice of the WTO to require a private actor receiving a WTOinconsistent subsidy to repay the granting government, then the WTO will need procedures for
assuring due process to the private actor. Adjudicating issues such as the value of the subsidy and
the proper repayment schedule should not be done in the absence of the corporation whose assets
are threatened with seizure. Even today, the WTO has failed to acknowledge the injustice to Howe
which had not done anything wrong under Australian law or WTO law. Howe did not violate WTO
law because the WTO does not impose any obligations on individuals.
When the Shipbuilding Agreement was negotiated in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1994, the governments recognized that private actors may
need due process rights before panels in government-to-government dispute settlement. The
Agreement provides that if a government seeks the remedy of collecting back from a shipbuilder the
amount of benefit it received exceeding the terms of the Agreement, then that shipbuilder shall be
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entitled to participate fully in the panel’s proceedings.82 The WTO needs a similar procedural
guarantee.
Improving Public Perceptions
Among the many reasons why public opinion undervalues the WTO is that the texts of the
WTO agreements are often difficult to understand. One key problem is that these agreements are
written in state-centric, mercantilist jargon that obfuscates who the beneficiaries of the WTO really
are. Very little international trade today involves governments on both sides of the transaction. Yet
several of the WTO agreements refer to “importing Members” or “exporting Members” as if the
governments were doing the trading.83 The ordinary citizen will understandably not be enthusiastic
about upholding rights for “importing Members”. This suggests that one task of the next trade
round should be to rewrite these confusing provisions. For example, the “importing Member” might
be rewritten as “the government of the country whose private actors are seeking to import”.
Conclusion
The Marrakesh Agreement and its annexes can be described as a treaty setting out the
obligations of WTO member governments to each other, but this description is incomplete. One of
the most important advances of the Uruguay Round was to extend world trade rules so that they
reach into the nation-state to adjust the status of the individuals residing therein. This
transformation of the GATT is an example of “institutional imagination and cautious
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experimentation” called for by Jürgen Habermas in his discussion of the role of procedural law in
satisfying the conditions of constitutional legitimacy.84
The Marrakesh Agreement addresses a kind of government failure that received very little
attention in the GATT. The new target is discriminatory and arbitrary action against the economic
actor. By embedding due process rights for individuals in national legal systems, the Uruguay
Round establishes a “more viable and durable multilateral trading system”.85 By providing a check
against arbitrary government action, the WTO better enables the individual to compete in the global
economy.
Although it is far from becoming a palladium of individual rights, the WTO fortifies the rights
of economic actors. The best-known institutionalization of rights occurs in TRIPS which was
partially based on existing treaties and partially sui generis. Far less known, though equally
important, are the new procedural obligations instilled horizontally in many of the annexed WTO
agreements. The obligations run from the WTO to governments, and then from governments to
economic actors. These individual rights are most developed in TRIPS, SCM, and the Antidumping
Agreements where, ironically, they empower individuals to prevent international trade that violates
WTO norms. Yet the interests of the users and consumers of imports are not disregarded. Both the
Antidumping and SCM agreements provide some beneficiaries of trade a right to participate in
antidumping and countervailing duty adjudications.
Two features of the WTO qualify it as constitutional in the views of some commentators, but a
third feature is just as important. The Marrakesh Agreement is constitutional in stating decision
rules and allocating authority among WTO organs. Furthermore, the Agreement is constitutional in
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prescribing international rules that bind governments, and in defining those powers that are reserved
to the national level. This article presents a third reason why the Marrakesh Agreement is
constitutional: because it indirectly accords rights to individuals. At the national level, the WTO
calls for private actors to have the right to participate in an adjudication that affects them. At the
international level, the WTO sponsors the Preshipment Inspection Entity. Although narrow in
scope, this Entity sets an important precedent.
In noting the constitutional features of the WTO, I am not suggesting that the WTO is
functionally equivalent to a national constitution. The WTO lacks an associated demos to accord it
legitimacy.86 Thus, the WTO draws its legitimacy from the consent of disconnected governments.
But an organization like the WTO is more than a tool of political delegation. It is also an organism,
enjoying international legal personality and the capacity to grow and change. If it can strengthen its
connections to economic (and social) actors around the globe, the WTO will gain more vitality and
public support.
The new relationship between the trading system and the individual actor is beginning to be
recognized in WTO jurisprudence. The Section 301 panel cut through the fog by explaining that “it
would be entirely wrong to consider that the position of individuals is of no relevance to the
GATT/WTO legal matrix”, and by pointing out that the multilateral trading system is “composed
not only of States but also, indeed mostly, of individual economic operators”. This holding has
drawn little attention by the government delegates that run the WTO. I would venture to guess that
if this particular proposition were put to a vote in the General Council of the WTO, it would be
rejected by governments who want to preserve the WTO as a cozy club of trade bureaucrats. In
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accordance with WTO procedures, however, the Section 301 decision was automatically adopted by
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. Thus, this cutting-edge decision will influence future WTO
panelists and the invisible college of international trade law in the years ahead.
Because it enhances both due process and property rights of economic actors, the WTO is more
than a commercial agreement; it is also a human rights agreement. In recent years, several
commentators have advocated that the WTO pay more attention to human rights norms. For
example, Raj Bhala in his trade law textbook writes that “If the GATT-WTO regime is a just one, in
the sense of Kant or his modern-day disciples who defend liberal democratic theory, then the central
focus of this regime must be on the protection and service of the individual”.87 Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann explains that “the globalization of production, trade and economic markets cannot
remain effective without a corresponding globalization of legal and institutional guarantees of
individual freedom, non-discrimination, rule of law, access to courts and democratic government”.88
In this article, I show how the trading system is already moving in the direction pointed to by Bhala
and Petersmann because of the many ways that the WTO strengthens economic rights and requires
national government to be more accountable to the individual.
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